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The Expressive Dimension of EU Criminal Lawt
Over the last decade, the European Union has begun actively leg-
islating in the area of criminal justice. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon
expressly acknowledged the EU's authority to pass criminal laws with
respect to certain serious offenses with a cross-border dimension. This
explicit grant of powers is one element of a remarkable evolution in the
European Union's identity-from an organization devoted primarily
to economic integration to a political union that increasingly resem-
bles a federal state.
This Article argues that the European Union has used its powers
to criminalize not only to address practical needs, but also to reaffirm
its core values and strengthen its political identity. An example of this
phenomenon is the decision to harmonize definitions of racist and
xenophobic crime across the Union. A review of the text and the draft-
ing history of EU measures against racist and xenophobic crime
suggests that they are best understood as a tool to express the Union's
commitment to human rights and equal treatment, rather than as a
response to pressing practical needs.
The Union's use of the criminal law for such purposes, while sym-
bolically powerful, raises some questions about the limits to EU
intervention in criminal justice. The Article discusses the difficulties
with establishing a legal basis for EU intervention in criminal justice
when no demonstrable transnational dimension is present. Policy con-
siderations-respect for state sovereignty, deference to democratic
decision-making, and a concern for the effective implementation of EU
laws-also recommend a cautious approach to legislating in this field.
Above all, the European Union should actively engage national par-
liaments in decisions to expand its reach over criminal law. While this
approach might reduce the frequency of EU legislation, it could
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strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of EU criminal law and
better serve the political goals to which Europe and its peoples aspire.
I. INTRODUCTION
Just three decades ago, most observers of the European Union
(and its predecessor, the European Community) would have dis-
missed the notion of EU criminal law as fanciful.' The original
understanding of the European Community was that it was an organ-
ization of limited powers, devoted primarily to economic integration.
Criminal law was firmly considered the exclusive province of member
states. 2 One would look in vain in textbooks and treatises on EC or
EU law for entries on criminal law or procedure.
In the 1990s, however, the picture began to change. The 1992
Maastricht Treaty first endowed the European Union with limited
competence to adopt measures related to cooperation in criminal mat-
ters. In the late 1990s, the European Council (comprised of the heads
of EU member states) encouraged EU institutions to use their new-
found authority in the field of criminal law. The Union did so and
defended its new role on the ground that criminal networks increas-
ingly crossed national borders.3
Although not always specifically mentioned in the EU treaties,
the cross-border dimension of crime was long seen as a key justifica-
tion for EU action.4 The recent Treaty of Lisbon codified this
understanding.5 Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) gives the Union authority "to establish min-
imum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and
sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-bor-
1. The European Union did not come into existence until 1992. But since most
readers today are familiar with the term "European Union," I use it here to include
both the Union and its predecessor, the European Community.
2. ANDRt KuP, EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAw 14 (2009); STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE
AND HOME AFFAIRS LAw 381-88 (2006); Mireille Delmas-Marty, The European Union
and Penal Law, 4 EuR. L.J. 87, 87 (1998). For a discussion of the indirect ways in
which EC law influenced national criminal law even in these early days, see Delmas-
Marty, supra, at 88-89; Hanna G. Sevenster, Criminal Law and EC Law, 29 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 29 (1992).
3. For an overview of the development of EU criminal law, see MARIA FLETCHER
ET AL., EU CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE 20-42 (2008); KiP, supra note 2, at 13-28;
VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, EU CRIMINAL LAW 5-36 (2009); PEERS, supra note 2, at 381-88.
4. See, e.g., DAMIEN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAw 611 (2010); Steve
Peers, The European Union and Substantive Criminal Law: Reinventing the Wheel?,
33 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 47, 55 (2002).
5. An exception is Article 83(2) of the TFEU, which does not require a cross-
border dimension and instead allows the EU to harmonize criminal laws when this is
essential to ensuring the effectiveness of existing EU rules. See infra note 105 and
accompanying text.
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der dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or
from a special need to combat them on a common basis."6
A closer look at the offenses which the European Union has cho-
sen to address, however, shows that the Union is not interested
merely in transnational crimes. The European Union has at times
taken a stand against certain conduct even if it has no significant
cross-border dimension and may be adequately addressed at the na-
tional level. The EU's action in such cases is better explained by a
different motivation-to reaffirm the Union's core values and to
strengthen its political identity. This is the expressive dimension of
EU criminal law.
An example of this phenomenon is the decision to harmonize def-
initions of racist and xenophobic crime across the Union. In 1994 and
again in 2008, the European Union passed measures to ensure that
member states' laws on racist and xenophobic crimes followed a com-
mon standard.7 Neither the drafting history nor the ultimate text of
the measures provides a persuasive case that these crimes have a
significant cross-border elements or that the European Union was
better positioned to address them than national authorities. Instead,
the decision to act in this area is best understood as a tool to express
the Union's commitment to human rights and equal treatment. EU
legislators chose the criminal label to send a message-that the en-
tire community believes racist and xenophobic conduct is
reprehensible and that the Union cares for the well-being of groups
who are likely to be victims of such crimes. The Union was not aiming
merely, or even primarily, to strengthen law enforcement measures
in these areas; instead, it was focused on organizing community val-
ues behind the condemnation of racist conduct and thus
strengthening the Union's political identity.9
6. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 83(1), May 9, 2008,
2008 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter TFEU].
7. Joint Action 96/443/JHA of 15 July 1996 Concerning Action to Combat Racism
and Xenophobia, 1996 O.J. (L 185) [hereinafter 1996 Joint Action to Combat Racism
and Xenophobia]; Framework Decision 2008/913 On Combating Certain Forms and
Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law, 2008 O.J. (L 328)
[hereinafter 2008 Racism and Xenophobia Framework Decision].
8. See infra Sections III.A and III.B. The treaty then in force did not specifically
require a cross-border element, but the offenses it listed as worthy of harmonization-
organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking-were seen as grave and typically
transnational, and these elements were seen to underlie EU competence to act. E.g.,
CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 4, at 611.
9. See infra Section III.C. Fletcher et al. have previously made the point that the
EU has used its criminal law powers to make value statements or for "moral postur-
ing." They list the Framework Decision on racist and xenophobic crime as an example
of this phenomenon. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 194-202. For a valuable discus-
sion of the expressive dimension of hate crimes legislation in the United States, see
Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool
for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U.L. REV. 1227, 1254 (2000).
2012] 557
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
The use of the criminal law for expressive purposes is not uncom-
mon at the national level. Indeed, some theorists have argued that
criminal law inherently serves expressive purposes.10 But at the su-
pranational level, the emphasis on expressive purposes, without
regard to the practical need for criminalization, has different implica-
tions. The European Union's desire to take advantage of the
expressive value of criminal law may come into conflict with the
wishes of member states to do the same. Accordingly, when the Euro-
pean Union begins to legislate for such purposes, questions about its
authority are likely to arise.
The text of the current treaties provides no clear authorization
for harmonizing criminal law on expressive grounds, particularly in
the absence of a cross-border dimension." There is a possible argu-
ment that Article 352, the implied powers provision, can serve as a
foundation for such legislation, but the claim is contestable. Such a
broad interpretation of the treaties is likely to give rise to objections
that the Union is overreaching and that member states and their citi-
zens have not authorized such sweeping EU powers in criminal
law. 12
Other considerations also suggest caution in asserting broad EU
powers to pass criminal laws. Criminal law is still regarded as an
essential feature of state sovereignty. It represents a community's
fundamental choice to use coercive measures in order to protect core
values.13 This is a choice that states believe is their prerogative to
make for themselves, through a democratic process, unless special
features of the crimes make it impossible to respond effectively at the
national level.14 Given that decision-making at the EU level (despite
recent improvements) is still less democratic than at the national
level, the invocation of state sovereignty also helps protect the demo-
cratic legitimacy of criminal law. 15 Treaty provisions on subsidiarity,
proportionality, and respect for national identities reflect these
concerns.
In response to these considerations, the European Union should
actively involve national parliaments in decisions to expand the
10. See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPON-
SIBILITY 98-118 (1970); Beale, supra note 9, at 1255; Dan M. Kahan, What Do
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP.
Paons. 401, 402-06 (1958); Mireille Hildebrandt, European Criminal Law and Euro-
pean Identity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 57, 65 (2007); Thomas Weigend, Strafrecht durch
internationale Vereinbarungen-Verlust an nationaler Strafrechtskultur?, ZSTW 105,
774, 789 (1993).
14. See, e.g., BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, paras. 355, 358-59.
15. Id. para. 358; see also Stephen C. Sieberson, The Treaty of Lisbon and Its
Impact on the European Union's Democratic Deficit, 14 COLUM. J. Eua. L. 445, 463-65
(2008); Weigend, supra note 13, at 789.
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reach of EU criminal law.1 6 Participation by national parliaments
might slow down and frustrate the passage of some criminal justice
legislation-especially measures that are perceived to encroach on
state prerogatives. But the involvement of national parliaments
would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of EU criminal law and
lessen concerns that the Union is overstepping its authority to act
under the Treaties. It would help ensure that EU decisions in crimi-
nal law respect national political identities and follow the EU's
bedrock principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Finally, be-
cause national parliaments are critical to the implementation of EU
criminal laws, involving them in the process would also increase the
effectiveness of these laws, while reducing perceptions that such laws
are curtailing national autonomy.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EU COMPETENCE OVER CRIMINAL MATTERS
For a long period of its existence, the European Community was
viewed and operated as a primarily economic organization. It was
committed to creating a common market, with the idea that economic
integration would help guarantee peace among European states.17 As
the European Community evolved and became the European Union,
the goal of economic integration brought with it an extension of com-
petences-"a spillover," as it is sometimes called-to certain non-
economic areas, such as environmental protection or safety stan-
dards. Increasingly, non-economic regulation was seen as necessary
to ensure the functioning of the internal market.' 8
The theory of spillover gradually made its way to criminal jus-
tice. Policymakers proffered the argument that as people, goods,
capital, and services moved freely throughout the Community, organ-
ized crime also gained the ability to operate more easily across
borders.19 In response to these concerns, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty
introduced member state cooperation in "justice and home affairs." 20
16. See infra Part V.
17. E.g., Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May, 1950, at http://europa.eufabc/
symbols/9-may/declten.htm.
18. LEON N. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMIcs OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTE-
GRATION 10-12 (1963).
19. E.g., European Commission, Prosecuting Criminals and Guaranteeing Indi-
viduals' Rights More Effectively in Free Movement Europe, at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/policies/criminal/policies criminalintroen.htm; see also MITSILEGAS, Supra
note 3, at 6-7; Margherita Cerizza & Giuseppe Martinico, Supranationalism in EU
Criminal Justice: Another Incoming Tide? 8 (2010), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1645804; Caroline Morgan & Jonathan Faull, The Role of
Criminal Law in the EU, 1 J. Eun. CRIM. L. REP. 17, 21 (2006); Joachim Vogel, The
European Integrated Criminal Justice System and Its Constitutional Framework, 12
MAASTRICHT J. EuR. & COMP. L. 125, 128 (2005); Anne Weyembergh, The Functions of
Approximation of Penal Legislation Within the European Union, 12 MAASTRICHT J.
EuR. & COMP. L. 149, 164 (2005).
20. E.g., MITSILEGAS, supra note 3, at 10.
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The Treaty provided the European Union with limited powers to pro-
mote cooperation and coordination in criminal matters, including the
power to harmonize rules in the areas of organized crime, terrorism
and drug-trafficking.
Recognizing the extent to which criminal law measures affected
national sovereignty, the drafters provided for a separate institu-
tional arrangement for decision-making in this area-the so-called
"third-pillar" method of lawmaking. Under it, the Council of Minis-
ters, the main legislative body of the Union, had to vote unanimously
to approve any measure, meaning that each member state had veto
power. This type of lawmaking departed from the standard "first-pil-
lar" method, which applied to economic integration measures and
under which legislation could be passed by qualified majority.21
Once the idea of cooperation in justice and home affairs was in-
troduced, it quickly gained popularity. The 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam strengthened the EU's ability to pass criminal law mea-
sures.22 Beginning in 1999, the European Council 23 began setting a
more activist agenda in this regard, leading to numerous efforts to
standardize definitions of offenses at the EU level. 2 4 The terrorist at-
tacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and later on Spain
in 2004 and Britain in 2005, strengthened the position of the advo-
cates for joint EU action on criminal matters. In 2004, the European
Council set out the Hague Programme, which focused on strengthen-
ing the protection of fundamental rights, fighting terrorism, and
developing a common strategy to tackle organized crime.25
Following the lead of the EU Council, EU legislators passed a
number of measures intended to strengthen the EU's internal secur-
ity. Some of these measures focused on police and judicial
21. The three-pillar structure aimed to accommodate the expansion of EU compe-
tences into more politically sensitive areas. The more established competences (those
most related to economic integration) were placed in the "first pillar" and were subject
to the "Community" method. Under it, the Council, alone or with the European Par-
liament, could pass binding legislation by qualified majority voting. Foreign policy
and common defense were placed in the "second pillar," subject to inter-governmental
cooperation. Immigration and criminal law were placed in the "third pillar." Under it,
the Council acted by unanimity and only had to consult the Parliament. The Euro-
pean Court of Justice also had only minimal authority to review third-pillar
legislation. PAUL CRAIG & GRAiNNE DE BURCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
14-18 (4th ed. 2008).
22. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 340).
23. The European Council comprises the heads of state of EU member states. It
provides general policy guidelines for the development of the Union, but does not have
concrete legislative powers.
24. At its 1999 meeting, the European Council defined "freedom, security and jus-
tice" as a priority area for EU policies over the next five years. Tampere European
Council, Presidency Conclusions (Oct. 15-16, 1999).
25. European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security
and Justice in the EU, Mar. 3, 2005, 2005 O.J. (C 53/1).
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cooperation. A prominent example was the European Arrest War-
rant, which facilitated extradition among EU member states.
Legislators also harmonized the definitions of certain cross-border
criminal offenses, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and
organized crime. 26 These standardization measures were not efforts
to create an EU "criminal code." Rather, they required member states
to align national criminal codes with definitions agreed upon at the
EU level. Enforcement remained the prerogative and responsibility of
national governments.
In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon formally recognized the EU's au-
thority to legislate in criminal law. It gave the European Union the
authority to establish minimum rules on offense definitions "in the
areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension re-
sulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special
need to combat them on a common basis."27 The Treaty lists several
areas of crime that meet these criteria: "terrorism, trafficking in
human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit
drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corrup-
tion, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and
organized crime." 28 It also provides the possibility of expanding the
list in the future, but only by unanimous decision of the Council and
only if the crimes meet the criteria of gravity and transnational di-
mension. 29 Another provision of the Treaty allows the Union to enact
criminal laws when this is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of
EU harmonization measures in other contexts. 30 In other words, the
European Union can use criminal law measures to enforce rules in
areas already subject to EU regulation, such as environmental and
intellectual property law.3 1
The Treaty of Lisbon also arguably makes it procedurally easier
for the European Union to pass criminal law measures. Council mem-
bers no longer need to be unanimous. They can act by qualified
majority, although the European Parliament will also have to give its
26. The EU also harmonized definitions of corruption, counterfeiting currency,
and fraud against the Union's financial interests. These crimes do not necessarily
have a transborder element, but are seen to directly affect core EU financial interests,
as well as economic integration more broadly. See Peers, supra note 4, at 55.
27. TFEU art. 83(1).
28. Id.
29. Id. The Council must also first obtain the consent of the European Parlia-
ment. Id.
30. Id. art. 83(2).
31. A few years before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, the European
Court of Justice had already recognized the EU's authority to act in this field. Com-
mission v. Council, Case C-176/03, [2005] ECR 1-7879. The Court held that the
European Community may pass certain criminal measures under the "first pillar"
method, whereby the Council may act by qualified majority, and the European Parlia-
ment must approve the measure. This competence was limited to situations when
criminalization was essential to ensuring the effectiveness of preexisting regulations
(such as the environmental regulations at issue in the case).
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approval. The result is that such legislation can now be adopted de-
spite objections by one or more states.
Recognizing that criminal law concerns sensitive national inter-
ests, however, the Treaty also includes an "emergency brake"
procedure, under which a state can refuse to participate in a particu-
lar measure where the measure "would affect fundamental aspects"
of the state's criminal justice system.32 When a state invokes the
"emergency brake," the proposal goes back to the European Council,
which will attempt to reach consensus. If it does so within four
months, it will refer the draft directive back to the EU legislators,
who may adopt the directive under the ordinary legislative process. If
the European Council does not reach consensus, but at least nine
member states wish to proceed with the directive, they may do so on
their own. If they adopt the directive, the state that had invoked the
emergency brake would not be bound by it; the law would apply only
in states that approved it.
Two other important principles that limit EU competence in
criminal law are subsidiarity and proportionality, and the Treaty of
Lisbon emphasizes their importance. Under the principle of sub-
sidiarity-which applies in areas where the European Union shares
competence with member states-EU action is valid only when na-
tional efforts have proven inadequate and EU action would be more
effective.33 The principle helps ensure that decisions are taken as
closely to the people as possible and are therefore more democrati-
cally legitimate.34 The Treaty of Lisbon includes a new procedure to
safeguard subsidiarity, under which national parliaments can object
to proposed EU legislation on the grounds that it violates sub-
sidiarity.3 5 The idea is that national parliaments are in a good
32. TFEU art. 82(3).
33. Treaty on European Union, art. 5(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/13) [here-
inafter TEU] ("[Tihe Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at cen-
tral level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects
of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level."); see also Protocol to the
Treaty of Amsterdam on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Propor-
tionality, 1997 O.J. 1997 (C 340/105).
34. Subsidiarity may be relevant to criminal law in another way as well. Some
have argued that it embodies the ultima ratio principle, widely adopted by European
criminal law scholars, under which criminalization should be "reserved for the most
serious invasion of interests since less serious misconduct is more appropriately dealt
with by civil law or by administrative regulation." Ester Herlin-Karnell, What Princi-
ples Drive (or Should Drive) European Criminal Law?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 1115, 1124
(2010).
35. National parliaments receive legislative plans and draft legislative proposals
from the Commission at the same time that these documents are sent to the EU legis-
lators. Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, 2010 O.J.
(C 83/203), arts. 1-2. If one-fourth of national legislative chambers object to a criminal
law directive, the Commission must review the draft legislation; if the Commission
wishes to maintain the proposal, it must provide a reasoned response. If a majority of
national legislative chambers object, the Treaty enables the Council and the Euro-
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position to assess whether legislation infringes on state sovereignty,
and they should therefore have a greater say in the process. The
Treaty itself recognizes that this subsidiarity review is especially val-
uable in matters of criminal law.3 6
The principle of proportionality further confines the Union's abil-
ity to harmonize criminal laws. Proportionality means that EU action
must not "exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaties."37 EU legislators must show that any proposed measure ac-
tually contributes to achieving its stated goals, goes no further than
is necessary to achieve these goals, and does not have an excessive
effect on the interests of the concerned state or person.38 In other
words, the measures should "not be a sledgehammer falling on a
nut."39 For criminal law measures, a robust proportionality analysis
might consider whether the costs in terms of reduced national auton-
omy are disproportionate to the stated objective of combating a
particular crime at the EU level. 40 Such an interpretation would be
consistent with the emphasis in the Treaty of Lisbon on respect for
national identity, particularly in the field of criminal law.4 1
Despite the limits imposed by proportionality and subsidiarity,
Union legislators have vigorously asserted their powers to enact
criminal justice measures. They have maintained that such measures
are essential to combating increasingly transnational criminal net-
works and ensuring that criminals do not escape prosecution by
moving freely across the Union.42
pean Parliament to more easily reject the proposed legislation. Protocol on the
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, 2010 O.J. (C 83/206),
art.7 [hereinafter Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol].
36. In criminal law matters, only one-fourth of national legislative chambers
must object to trigger the subsidiarity review; in other areas, one-third of parliaments
must object. Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 35, art.7(2).
37. TEU art. 5(4).
38. CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 4, at 367; Gareth Davies, Subsidiarity: The
Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time, 43 COMMON Mcr L.REv. 63, 71
(2006); Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising), Case C-376/98,[20001 ECR 1-8419.
39. Davies, supra note 38, at 71.
40. See id. at 71, 83. Some read the ECJ's case law on proportionality as setting a
less demanding standard, particularly when it comes to reviewing the actions of EU
institutions rather than of member states. See, e.g., CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 4, at
368-69; Stephen Weatherill, Competence Creep and Competence Control, 23 Y.B. EUR.
L. 1, 13-17 (2004).
41. TEU art. 4(2).
42. E.g., European Commission, Justice: Criminal Law Policy, at http://ec.europa.
eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/index en.htm; see also HOUSE OF COMMONS
JUSTICE COMMITTEE, JUSTICE ISSUES IN EUROPE, SEVENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009-
10, H.C. 162-1, at 6 (Mar. 23, 2010); Anne Weyembergh, Approximation of Criminal
Laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague Programme, 42 COMMON Micr. L. REV.
1567, 1579 (2005).
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III. THE EXPRESSIVE DIMENSION OF EU CRIMINAL LAW: MEASURES
AGAINST RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA
While most arguments for EU competence in criminal law have
focused on the practical need for supranational intervention, this
alone does not explain EU action in the field. Instead, one must look
to the expressive value of criminal law to fully understand the EU's
motivation to act. The Union's measures against racist and xenopho-
bic crime provide an instructive example.
A. Legislative History
In the 1990s, the European Union began adopting a series of
measures to combat racism and xenophobia. Some of these were
largely symbolic. They included declarations condemning racism and
xenophobia and calling for a "vigorous and effective" response; setting
up bodies to gather information on racism and xenophobia; and
designating 1997 as a European Year Against Racism. 43 Others, how-
ever, imposed concrete obligations on member states to criminalize
racist and xenophobic conduct.
In 1994, the European Council called for "a global strategy at the
Union level aimed at combating acts of racist and xenophobic vio-
lence."44 Two years later, at Spain's initiative, the European Union
passed a Joint Action to Combat Racism and Xenophobia.45 A joint
action is a tool introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht to allow for the
harmonization of criminal law. Joint actions identify specific objec-
tives to be attained by member states, but they are not binding and
have been called "little more than aspirational."46 As part of the 1996
Joint Action, member states committed to ensure that their domestic
laws criminalize racist and xenophobic behavior or at least do not
subject such offenses to the double criminality requirement for
extradition.47
The Joint Action was passed against the background of increased
national efforts to criminalize racist and xenophobic speech. In the
43. European Commission, Commission Communication of 13 December 1995 on
Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism 4-6, COM (1995) 653 [hereinafter 1995 Com-
mission Communication]; Press Release, Europa, European Year against Racism Is
Launched in The Hague (Jan. 30, 1997), at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/97/72&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en.
44. Corfu European Council of 24 to 25 June 1994, Conclusions of the Presidency,
at 18.
45. 1996 Joint Action to Combat Racism and Xenophobia, supra note 7.
46. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3, at 174.
47. Double criminality is typically a requirement for extradition. Under it, a per-
son would be extradited from one country to another only if the crime is punishable in
both. In other words, the country holding the person to be extradited (Country A) may
refuse to proceed with extradition to Country B if the offense with which the person is
charged in Country B is not a crime in Country A.
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mid-1990s, Germany, France, Belgium, and Spain all passed legisla-
tion criminalizing Holocaust denial.48 This domestic legislation was
in large part a reaction to the resurgence of extreme-right nationalist
parties and to ethnic tensions resulting from growing immigration.49
The European Union began to legislate in the area of immigration
around the same time, and it concluded that it should also address
the related increase in racist and xenophobic crime.50 As the Euro-
pean Commission acknowledged, however, the Treaties contained no
"specific reference to action in this area."51
The next major step came in 1999, when the Treaty of Amster-
dam entered into force. The Treaty strengthened the EU's ability to
harmonize criminal laws. It also provided a legal basis "to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability or sexual orientation."52 With respect to criminal mea-
sures, the Treaty stated that the Union would aim to "provide
citizens with high levels of safety within an area of freedom, security,
and justice by developing common action among Member States in
the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and
by preventing and combating racism and xenophobia."53 To achieve
this objective, the European Union would act to prevent and combat
"crime, organized or otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in
persons and offenses against children, illicit drug trafficking and il-
licit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud, through . . .
approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters in the
Member States . .. ."54 Article 31(e), which specifically allowed for
harmonization of criminal law, narrowed the list of offenses to be ad-
dressed to organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking.55 Neither
list included racist and xenophobic crime. This arguably weakened
the legal basis for EU measures in this regard.56
48. Laurent Pech, The Law of Holocaust Denial in Europe: Towards a (Qualified)
EU-wide Criminal Prohibition 7, 9 (2009), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/
jeanmonnet/papers/09/091001.pdf.
49. See id.; Jorg Monar, The EU's Role in the Fight Against Racism and Xenopho-
bia: Evaluation and Prospects After Amsterdam and Tampere, 22 LIVERPOOL L.REV. 7,
8 (2000).
50. Monar, supra note 49, at 8.
51. 1995 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 18.
52. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 13, as amended by Treaty
of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1.
53. Treaty on European Union, art. 29, as amended by Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct.
2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145.
54. Id.
55. Id. art. 31(e).
56. It would be difficult to argue that the European Union could instead rely on
Article 29, which stated as an EU goal "combating racism and xenophobia." This pro-
vision merely stated a broad objective, and it can be used only in conjunction with a
more specific provision, or the implied powers provision, in order to provide compe-
tence. Yet the then-existing implied provision could only be used if the European
Union was pursuing an objective that was related to the operation of the common
market. Neither the drafting history nor the text of the Framework Decision makes
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Nonetheless, the European Union had high-level political sup-
port for measures against racist and xenophobic crime. The heads of
EU member states, meeting at the 1999 Tampere European Council,
called on the European Union to take strong steps against these
problems.57 As the European Commission began considering what ac-
tion would be most appropriate, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution requesting that the European Union pass a "framework
decision"-a binding instrument-to replace the non-binding Joint
Action on racist and xenophobic crimes.58 The Commission began to
draft a framework decision, and in 2002, it presented a proposal to
the Council.59
The proposal included a greater range of offenses than did the
1996 Joint Action, and it also mandated that all states criminalize
these offenses at the national level.60 Because the proposal criminal-
ized both speech and conduct, it proved controversial. Several states
worried that the proposed Framework Decision conflicted with their
own laws protecting freedom of expression.61 A minority opinion at-
tached to the European Parliament report on the proposed
Framework Decision also expressed concern that the legislation was
"an attack on freedom of expression" and would extend to "legitimate
public discourse, for example opposition to mass immigration or to
any suggestion that the criminalization of racist conduct and speech is related to the
operation of the common market.
57. Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions (Oct. 15-16, 1999).
58. European Parliament Resolution on the European Union's Position at the
World Conference Against Racism and the Current Situation in the Union, Sept. 21,
2000, 2001 O.J. (C 146/110).
59. The European Commission is the institution which proposes and drafts legis-
lation in the European Union.
60. In other words, states no longer had the choice to either abolish dual criminal-
ity or criminalize; they had to criminalize specified conduct. European Commission,
Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia,
COM (2001) 664 final (Mar. 26, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Commission Proposal for a
Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia]. The proposal and the final text of
the Framework Decision had other provisions that went beyond the 1996 Joint Ac-
tion. For example, they mandated that states take necessary measures to ensure that
investigations and prosecutions of racist crimes are not dependent on complaints by
victims, "at least in the most serious cases where the conduct has been committed in
[the state's] territory." 2008 Racism and Xenophobia Framework Decision, supra note
7, art. 8. They also required states to ensure that corporations can be held liable for
racist and xenophobic conduct under certain circumstances. Id. arts. 5, 6.
61. At the time, domestic laws in several countries, including Italy, Greece, Den-
mark and Hungary, protected free speech from criminalization, unless it posed a
"clear and present danger" of violence. Pech, supra note 48, at 6-7. In the United
Kingdom, speech was protected unless it was "threatening, abusive, or insulting" and
intended or likely to stir up racial hatred. Id. at 6; The Crown Prosecution Service,
Racist and Religious Crime - CPS Guidance (June 23, 2010), at http://www.cps.gov.uk/
legal/p to r/racist_and _religious crime. Not surprisingly, many of these countries ex-
pressed reservations about the Framework Decision. E.g., EU Criminalises Racial
Hatred, EuRAcTiv, Apr. 23, 2007, at http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-criminal
ises-racial-hatred/article-163291.
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Islamisation, or defence of national identity."62 As a result, the law
would "render[] any debate on immigration and Islam impossible
and . . . result in arbitrary complaints and prosecutions of leading
politicians in this debate."63
Because of concerns about the potential conflict with free speech
protections, it was not until 2008 that the Council adopted the final
text of the Framework Decision.64 In the end, the legislation ex-
panded the list of punishable offenses beyond those included in the
1996 Joint Action. For example, it includes "publicly condoning, deny-
ing or grossly trivializing crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. .. directed against a group of persons or a
member of such a group defined by reference to race, colour, religion,
descent or national or ethnic origin .... ."65 It also prohibits the de-
nial, condoning, and gross trivialization of the Holocaust.66
But to accommodate concerns about freedom of expression, the
Framework Decision provides a number of qualifications. First, the
punishable conduct must be "likely to incite violence or hatred
against a group defined by reference to race, color, religion, descent,
or national or ethnic origin."67 Second, states "may choose to punish
only conduct which is either carried out in a manner likely to disturb
public order or which is threatening, abusive, or insulting."68 Third,
they may choose to criminalize denial and trivialization offenses only
if these have been established by a final decision of a national or in-
ternational court.69 Fourth, the legislation affirms that it will not
modify "the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamen-
tal legal principles, including freedom of expression and association,
as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union."70 Fi-
nally, it will not require states "to take measures in contradiction to
. . . freedom of the press and the freedom of expression in other
media."7
62. European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Council Framework Deci-
sion on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by
Means of Criminal Law, at 15, A6-0444/2007 (Nov. 14, 2005) (Minority opinion pursu-
ant to Rule 48(3) of the Rules of Procedure by Koenraad Dillen) [hereinafter EP
Report on Proposal for Framework Decision].
63. Id.; see also Eva Brems, Belgium: The Vlaams Blok Political Party Convicted
Indirectly of Racism, 4 INT'L J. CONST'L L. 702, 705 (2006) (noting the prosecution of
Dillen's own Flemish Block party for racist speech).
64. 2008 Racism and Xenophobia Framework Decision, supra note 7.
65. Id. art. 1(c); see also 1996 Joint Action to Combat Racism and Xenophobia,
supra note 7, at A(b) & (c).
66. 2008 Racism and Xenophobia Framework Decision, supra note 7, art. 1(d).
67. Id. art. 1(c) & (d).
68. Id. art. 2.
69. Id. art. 1(d)(4).
70. Id. art. 7(1).
71. Id. art. 7(2). The clause states further that it refers to such principles "as they
result from constitutional traditions or rules governing the rights and responsibilities
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B. The Official Justification of the Measures
In justifying the need for action in 1995 and again in 2001, the
Commission pointed to the increased prevalence of public racism and
discrimination in all member states.72 The Commission concluded
that "the existence of racist incidents in all Member States makes it a
European problem that requires . . . a global strategy to combat acts
of racist and xenophobic violence at [sic] Union level ... ."73 The 1996
Joint Action also expressly referred to the prevalence of racist and
xenophobic crime as a motivating concern. 74 The European Parlia-
ment, in its 2007 report on the Commission's proposal, similarly
referred to statistics showing that "racist crimes are on the rise in at
least eight EU Member States" and that "racist violence and crime
remains a serious social ill across the EU."75
Yet none of these documents pointed to evidence that racist and
xenophobic crimes have a significant transnational dimension. The
Commission did note the "worrying issue" of the spread of racist prop-
aganda on the Internet, suggesting a cross-border element.76 But it
pointed only to data about racist websites outside the EU.77 Moreo-
ver, it recognized that the problem was already being addressed
under the auspices of a Council of Europe Cyber-Crime Convention.78
A Protocol to that Convention, signed in 2003, criminalized the dis-
semination of racist and xenophobic contents online. Given that the
Protocol was open for signature to EU member states, the practical
need for a parallel commitment by the European Union appears di-
minished. Finally, nothing in the text or drafting history of the
Decision suggests that its focus is online racist crime. The Decision
sweeps much more broadly, covering conduct and speech both online
and off.
Given the lack of an obvious cross-border component, the Com-
mission had to provide other reasons why racist crime should not
remain a matter of national law.79 To defend the need for a suprana-
tional response, it noted the diversity of approaches to racist conduct
of, and the procedural guarantees for, the press or other media where these rules
relate to the determination or limitation of liability."
72. 1995 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 3, 16; 2002 Commission
Proposal for a Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia, supra note 60, at 2.
73. 1995 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 16.
74. 1996 Joint Action to Combat Racism and Xenophobia, supra note 7.
75. EP Report on Proposal for Framework Decision, supra note 62, at 13.
76. 2002 Commission Proposal for a Framework Decision on Racism and Xeno-
phobia, supra note 60, at 5.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 6.
79. The Commission admitted that under the principle of subsidiarity, primary
responsibility for combating racist conduct lies with national authorities unless the
Union is better equipped to achieve the objective of combating racist and xenophobic
crime effectively. 2002 Commission Proposal for a Framework Decision on Racism
and Xenophobia, supra note 60, at 15.
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and speech in member states.80 This diversity appears to exist prima-
rily in the regulation of hate speech and genocide denial. In 2001,
only ten out of twenty-seven EU member states had laws criminaliz-
ing the denial of the Holocaust or other genocides and crimes against
humanity.8 1 The Commission and the European Parliament con-
cluded that this divergence in domestic criminal laws, combined with
the prevalence of racist violence across the Union, called for harmoni-
zation at the EU level.
EU legislators expressed concern that different approaches to the
punishment of racist and xenophobic crime "constitute barriers to in-
ternational judicial cooperation." 8 2 The Commission stressed the
need to prevent perpetrators of racist and xenophobic offenses from
escaping prosecution by moving between states.83 The Framework
Decision itself justified harmonization by pointing to a study showing
that "some difficulties have still been experienced regarding judicial
cooperation."8 4 The Decision did not, however, refer to concrete data
on the source or seriousness of the problem with judicial cooperation
in this area.
The Commission did note that victims underreported racist and
xenophobic crimes because of fears of retaliation or concerns that
their complaints would not be taken seriously. It concluded that EU
legislation ensuring that investigation and prosecution do not depend
on a victim's complaint would help improve the situation.85 The Com-
mission did not clarify, however, how prevalent the underreporting
problem was and which countries lacked provisions allowing investi-
gation and prosecution in the absence of a complaint by the victim.
In summary, EU institutions based the argument for harmoniza-
tion on the prevalence of racist crime, the diverse national laws
addressing the issue, difficulties with mutual legal assistance, and
the problems of combating racist crime in countries where prosecu-
tion depends on complaint by the victim. These factors, however, do
not provide a clear limit to the EU's authority to legislate in the area
of criminal law. The same factors are likely to be present in the inves-
tigation and prosecution of many offenses occurring across the
European Union. Burglary, theft, and rape (to name just a few) are
undoubtedly also prevalent in all member states, and states surely
differ in their approaches to such crimes, which would pose similar
80. Id. at 3, 16.
81. Pech, supra note 48, at 3.
82. 1996 Joint Action to Combat Racism and Xenophobia, supra note 7; see also
2002 Commission Proposal for a Framework Decision on Racism and Xenophobia,
supra note 60, at 5.
83. 2002 Commission Proposal for a Framework Decision on Racism and Xeno-
phobia, supra note 60, at 5.
84. 2008 Racism and Xenophobia Framework Decision, supra note 7, pmbl. (4).
85. 2002 Commission Proposal for a Framework Decision on Racism and Xeno-
phobia, supra note 60, at 6.
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difficulties in mutual legal assistance. To the extent that national
systems rely on victim complaints for prosecution, some of these
crimes are also likely to remain unpunished because of victims' reluc-
tance to come forward (for example, in cases of sexual abuse). But
these difficulties do not necessarily call for an EU-wide response.
None of the EU institutions pointed to evidence establishing a
clear cross-border dimension of racist and xenophobic crime. Al-
though such a dimension was said to exist because defendants
crossed borders to escape prosecution, the Commission's proposal
failed to refer to concrete data on this point. The proposal also failed
to provide empirical support regarding subsidiarity. It pointed to no
source showing that national authorities were unwilling or unable to
address racist and xenophobic crimes, or that the European Union
would perform better in confronting these problems. The minority
opinion to the European Parliament report on the Framework Deci-
sion criticized the proposed decision on these grounds, noting that
"[iut is perfectly possible for the Member States to provide protection
against racist acts by means of their laws."86 Indeed, if the European
Union could legislate on criminal matters any time an offense is prev-
alent and national authorities address it differently, it is difficult to
see the endpoint of EU powers in this field.
C. The Expressive Dimension of the Measures
While statements about the practical need for EU laws on racist
crime were not entirely persuasive, EU institutions did point to other
factors that could better explain the legislation.8 7 One reason promi-
nently mentioned as a justification for EU-wide action is the symbolic
value of such legislation:
The need to build the foundations of a wider and deeper com-
munity between peoples who had too often opposed each
other in violent conflict was central to the ideals that in-
spired the founders of the Community. The defence of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, core values of the
European integration project, cannot be separated from the
rejection of racism. Indeed, the struggle against racism is a
constituent element of the European identity.88
86. EP Report on Proposal for Framework Decision, supra note 62, at 15 (Minor-
ity opinion pursuant to Rule 48(3) of the Rules of Procedure by Koenraad Dillen).
87. One factor was political demand for EU action in the field. See 1995 Commis-
sion Communication, supra note 43, at 3 (noting "calls from many quarters for a clear
European-level response to complement and support national action"). Human rights
groups and some national governments were increasingly concerned "that the grow-
ing EU activities in the area of asylum and immigration were almost exclusively on
the restrictive and repressive side and did largely fail to respond to the need of com-
bating intolerance in the receiving societies ..... Monar, supra note 49, at 9.
88. 1995 Commission Communication, supra note 43, at 4.
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In other words, the Commission regarded the elimination of racism
and xenophobia as part of a broader project to reaffirm the EU's com-
mitment to human rights and non-discrimination. By using the
criminal law to defend these principles, the Commission was reaf-
firming their importance to the political identity of the Union.
The European Parliament report also referred to the symbolic
function of the legislation. It emphasized that the promotion of
human rights and the fight against racism and xenophobia were two
of the EU's main priorities.89 The Parliament noted that by adopting
the Framework Decision, the Union would "send out a firm political
message on behalf of fundamental rights."90 Other important players
in the drafting process expressed similar sentiments. The German
government, a key supporter of the legislation, issued a press release
after its adoption, noting that the Framework Decision helped Eu-
rope "to forcefully defend its common values and to rigorously punish
those who treat these values with contempt for humanity."9 '
Other evidence also suggests that the symbolic value of the
Framework Decision, rather than any pressing practical need, was
the main reason for its adoption. The final text of the Decision accom-
modated divergent national approaches to combating racism and
xenophobia. States which did not criminalize hate speech, unless it
was threatening, abusive, or insulting, could continue to take this
more tolerant approach. In the end, the Framework Decision did not
demand harmonization in the areas where the greatest divergence
among states existed-hate speech and Holocaust denial. Therefore,
one of the key rationales for the Framework Decision, that harmoni-
zation was necessary to ensure judicial cooperation in multi-
jurisdictional cases, appears unfulfilled. This tends to confirm the no-
tion that the legislation was passed primarily for symbolic, rather
than practical reasons.
Also worth noting is that, by the time the Framework Decision
was adopted, the European Union had abolished the requirement of
89. EP Report on Proposal for Framework Decision, supra note 62, at 14.
90. Id.; see also European Parliament Recommendation to the Council of 21 June
2007 Concerning the Progress of the Negotiations on the Framework Decision on Ac-
tion to Combat Racism and Xenophobia, [20081 O.J. C 146 E/361 (urging the Council
to finalize the text of the Framework Decision so as to "send out a strong political
message in support of a citizens' Europe").
91. Press Release, [German] Federal Ministry of Justice, EU: Common Criminal
Provisions Against Racism and Xenophobia (Apr. 19, 2007), at http://www.eu2007.de/
en/News/Press Releases/April/0420BMJRassismus.html. Germany played a central
role in reviving the stalled Framework Decision, and the Decision was ultimately
signed during the French presidency of the Union, which also provided key support.
Other major supporters were Luxembourg and Spain. German Holocaust Denial Case
Proceeds as EU Moves on a Ban, Deutsche Welle, Jan. 26, 2007, at http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,2328344,00.html; Nathalie Vandystadt, Justice Council: Minis-
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dual criminality in cases of racist and xenophobic crimes. Under the
2002 Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW),
even if a person has fully complied with the law in one EU member
state, he may be extradited to another member state if he has com-
mitted a racist or xenophobic offense under the laws of that second
state. To a great degree, the EAW Framework Decision solved
problems with mutual legal assistance that might plague national
prosecutions of racist and xenophobic crimes. This diminishes the
practical need for an EU instrument harmonizing the definitions of
racist offenses. 92
Finally, given that the duty to enforce the law remains with na-
tional authorities, the practical impact of the Framework Decision on
racist and xenophobic crime is likely to be limited. The Framework
Decision imposes few requirements pertaining to the investigation
and prosecution of racist and xenophobic crimes. The only clear re-
quirement is that states ensure that prosecutions can occur even in
the absence of a victim complaint. It does not appear that the Frame-
work Decision contributes in other ways to enforcement efforts at the
national level. This, again, points to a conclusion that the expressive
value of the Framework Decision is greater than its practical impact.
In short, the European Union is using the Framework Decision
primarily to make a statement about the values for which it stands.
It is sending a message that racist crime breaches core norms of the
Union-protecting human rights regardless of race or ethnicity.93 It
is also showing its solidarity with minority groups who may be
targeted by criminals. By criminalizing certain instances of racist
and xenophobic speech, the European Union is more broadly making
a statement about the balance it wishes to strike between individual
rights (such as freedom of expression) and social interests (such as
public safety and equal treatment).94
The European Union is thus using criminal law measures such
as the Framework Decision as a means of expressing and defining its
92. There are, however, some exceptions to the duty of EU member states to sur-
render a person pursuant to an EAW request. For example, if the offense was
committed at least in part on the territory of the executing state, that state may re-
fuse to surrender a person if its laws do not criminalize the offense. Framework
Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender proce-
dures between Member States [20021 O.J. L 190/1, art. 4(7).
93. BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, para. 355 ("By criminal law, a legal com-
munity gives itself a code of conduct that is anchored in its values, and whose
violation, according to the shared convictions on law, is regarded as so grievous and
unacceptable for social co-existence in the community that it requires punishment.");
Hildebrandt, supra note 13, at 65; Weigend, supra note 13, at 774, 789; Hart, Jr.,
supra note 13, at 402-06.
94. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries:
Common Standards and Conflicting Values in the Protection of Human Rights in the
European Legal Space, in AN IDENTITY FOR EUROPE: THE RELEVANCE OF MULTICUL-
TURALISM IN EU CONSTRUCTION 73, 77 (Riva Kastoryano ed., 2009).
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own political identity.95 This expressive use of criminal law is best
understood as part of a larger project to help construct an identity for
the Union that goes beyond economic issues and can therefore claim
deeper bonds of allegiance over time.96 By reinforcing common moral
norms, the European Union can help build the supranational demos
which it is repeatedly said to lack and which is seen by many as a
prerequisite to genuine legitimacy.
Through the conduct that it chooses to criminalize, the European
Union can also distinguish itself from other polities around the world
which do not penalize the same conduct or perhaps treat it more leni-
ently.97 This is another way of cementing the EU's identity by
reference to what it is not. Finally, the European Union can use the
expressive function of criminal law to bolster its efforts to lead glob-
ally on certain moral and legal issues, such as equal treatment and
human rights.98
To send such messages, EU criminal law does not need to be
more effective than existing national efforts to combat crime. Indeed,
even if it is not particularly practically useful, it can still be success-
ful on expressive grounds. As Cass Sunstein has commented:
A society might identify the kind of valuation to which it is
committed and insist on that kind, even if the consequences
of the insistence are obscure or unknown. A society might,
for example, insist on an antidiscrimination law for expres-
sive reasons even if it does not know whether the law
actually helps members of minority groups.99
95. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84
N.C. L. REV. 779, 835 (2006).
96. As Joirg Monar has commented, the "emphasis on the fight against racism and
xenophobia must be regarded as part of the efforts made to assert the value based
political identity which the Union-coming of age as a political community-is in
need of." Monar, supra note 49, at 9.
97. Turkey, for example, expressed concern about the Framework Decision, on
the grounds that it would criminalize denial of the 1915 genocide against Armenians
and undermine Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. E.g., German Anti-Racism
Initiative Creates Concern in Ankara, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Mar. 30, 2007, 2007
WLNR 6010632. Eastern European countries, during accession negotiations and the
early days of EU membership, also saw the Decision as a way to exclude their con-
cerns and to shame them for their treatment of the Roma and other minorities.
European Parliament Resolution, supra note 58, 26; Racism and Xenophobia, MEPs
Pass Motion Against Rising Racist and Homophobic Violence, Eun. Soc. POL'Y, July
13, 2006, 2006 WLNR 24793187.
98. See, e.g., Ian Manners, The EU's International Promotion of the Rights of the
Child, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF GLOBALIZATION 228
(Jan Orbie & Lisa Tortell eds., 2008).
99. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 779, 823 (1994).
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Apart from its practical consequences, the value of a criminal law
adopted for expressive purposes lies in its ability to "make the best
sense of [a community's] self-understanding."100
In nation-states, law, and especially criminal law, is only one of
many tools that shape national identity. Geography, culture, religion,
history, and language, among other factors, all play a role in the pro-
cess. But in a supranational polity such as the EU, law assumes a
relatively more dominant role. As Mireille Hildebrandt has noted,
"there is no 'inherently European identity"' that can easily be defined
by reference to geography, history, culture, or language.' 01 For that
reason, it is likely that law plays a more central part in constructing
identity at the EU level than it does nationally.102
IV. THE SCOPE OF EU CRIMINAL LAW AFTER THE TREATY OF
LISBON: LEGAL BASIS, LIMITS, AND RESERVATIONS
While the Framework Decision is the clearest example of an EU
criminal law measure adopted for expressive purposes, it is not the
only one. Measures on environmental crimes, child sexual abuse, and
child pornography, for example, have also exhibited expressive ele-
ments. 03 In the future, as unanimity is no longer required for
criminal law measures, the European Union may be even more
tempted to adopt such measures on expressive grounds. On the heels
of the Framework Decision on racist and xenophobic crime, for exam-
ple, the Council called on the Commission to consider whether a new
framework decision may be needed to address the public denial or
trivialization of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes.104 As the
Union contemplates the scope of its newly acquired powers, it is im-
portant to consider the legal basis for intervention in criminal law
matters under the current treaty framework.
100. Id.
101. Hildebrandt, supra note 13, at 59.
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Michael Faure, European Environmental Criminal Law: Do We Re-
ally Need It?, Eui. ENVT'L L. REv. 18, 24 (Jan. 2004); FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3,
at 197-98.
104. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council,
The Memory of the Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes in Europe,
COM(2010) 783 final at 2 (Dec. 22, 2010). The Commission ultimately concluded that
a new framework decision on this subject is not warranted at this time, for two rea-
sons: 1) These crimes are not specifically listed in the Treaty as falling within the
competence of the Union (although according to the Commission, the Council could
act unanimously to extend the EU's competence; the Commission does not discuss
whether the Council may do so only upon finding that the crime has a cross-border
element); 2) National legal approaches to this question are too disparate to allow for
harmonization. Id. at 9-10. For a discussion of the link between the proposed legisla-
tion and identity politics within the European Union, see Carlos Closa, Dealing with
the Past: Memory and European Integration (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 1/11,
2011), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1972355.
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Even after the Treaty of Lisbon expanded the European Union's
authority to legislate on criminal matters, there is no clear and solid
legal basis for adopting a measure such as the Framework Decision
on racist and xenophobic crime. EU legislators could enact such a
measure under Article 83(1) of the TFEU, but this would require
showing that the offense has a cross-border dimension. The cross-bor-
der dimension may result from the "nature or impact" of the offenses
or from "a special need to combat them on a common basis." Under an
expansive reading, "special need to combat them on a common basis"
might include expressive needs (i.e., protecting core values of the
Union). But because virtually any EU criminal law can be said to
protect core values of the Union, such an interpretation would oblit-
erate the limits placed on EU competence in this field. It would also
render the cross-border dimension requirement irrelevant. Finally,
even if one were to conclude that racist and xenophobic crimes do
have a cross-border dimension, they are not among the offenses enu-
merated in Article 83(1). To act under this provision, then, the
Council would have to decide unanimously, after obtaining the Euro-
pean Parliament's consent, to identify racist crime as a subject
worthy of harmonization.
In support of a legal basis, one might also point to Article 67(3) of
the TFEU, which provides that the "EU shall endeavor to ensure a
high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime,
racism and xenophobia ... if necessary, through the approximation of
criminal laws." But Article 67(3) is largely hortatory, setting out
broad objectives. Unlike the much more specific Article 83, it does not
explain who would have to adopt the approximating measures and
under what procedures. Moreover, if Article 67(3) on its own provided
for EU competence to harmonize criminal laws, Article 83 would be
superfluous.
Another possibility might be Article 83(2), which allows the Eu-
ropean Union to pass criminal laws to "ensure the effective
implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject
to harmonisation measures." But the type of conduct criminalized by
the Framework Decision-racist speech and conduct, as well as geno-
cide denial and trivialization-has not been previously subject to EU
harmonization measures. The criminal measures envisioned under
Article 83(2) are those pertaining to violations of environmental, in-
tellectual property law and other administrative offenses. 05 A
creative interpretation of Article 83(2) might point to the EU direc-
tive banning racial discrimination in employment and social
benefits 06 and argue that a measure criminalizing racist crime helps
105. See Commission v. Council, Case C-176/03, [2005] ECR 1-7879.
106. Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin,
O.J. L 180/22 (July 19, 2000).
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implement it. But this would be an overly expansive reading, since
the Framework Decision focused on the public incitement of racist
violence and on the denial of genocide, and neither of these offenses is
closely related to discrimination in employment or social benefits.
In the end, the best argument for the European Union's author-
ity to act in this field might arise from an interpretation of its implied
powers. Article 352 of the TFEU-known as the implied powers pro-
vision-allows the Union to legislate to achieve one of the Treaty's
objectives, when no other provision furnishes the basis for action. It
has been compared to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 1 0 7 In the past, it could be used to advance only goals
related to the common market, but the Treaty of Lisbon expanded its
scope to include virtually any objectives of the Treaty.108
To prevent abuse of this expanded competence, Article 352 sets
stringent procedural requirements. The Council must be unanimous,
and the European Parliament must consent before any legislation
can be adopted under the provision. Unanimity helps safeguard state
sovereignty, and European Parliament consent adds greater demo-
cratic legitimacy to the legislation. To use Article 352, the European
Union must also conclude that no other Treaty article applies.109 As
noted above, no other provision of the Treaty appears to offer a solid
legal basis for EU criminal law measures against racism and xeno-
phobia. Legislation passed under Article 352 must furthermore
advance an EU objective that is expressly stated in the Treaty. In the
case of racism and xenophobia, this should not be particularly diffi-
cult.110 EU legislators may point to Article 3(2), which lists as key
goals of the Union the prevention and combating of crime and the
combating of social exclusion and discrimination.1 1 1 The European
Union has also committed to act "to combat discrimination based on
... racial or ethnic origin ... ."112 and "to ensure a high level of
security through measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and
xenophobia."' 1 3 In short, combating racial and ethnic discrimination
107. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW
106 (3d ed. 2011).
108. Two Declarations appended to the Treaty limit Article 352 somewhat, but
even so, the provision is significantly broader than it was before the Treaty of Lisbon.
See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, Declarations 41 and 42, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) 1 [hereinafter Declaration 41, Declaration 42].
109. TFEU art. 352.
110. Note, however, that a Declaration to the Treaty of Lisbon limits the extent to
which the EU may use Article 352 broadly to "promote ... its values." Declaration 41,
supra note 108; see also TEU art. 3(1); ALIAN RosAs & LORNA ARMATI, EU CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 22 (2010); CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 4, at 216-17.
111. TEU art. 3(2).
112. TFEU art. 10.
113. TFEU art. 67(3).
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is undoubtedly an important objective of the Union, and it could
therefore serve as the basis for action under Article 352.
But the EU's implied powers clause has always been controver-
sial, and it is likely to be even more so now that its scope is broader.
Because of concerns that the clause can be abused to effectively
amend the Treaty without a proper ratification process, Declarations
to the Lisbon Treaty attempt to limit its use. Restating settled ECJ
case law, one Declaration provides that Article 352 "cannot serve as a
basis for widening the scope of Union powers beyond the general
framework created by the provisions of the Treaties as a whole."114
Furthermore, the Article "cannot be used as a basis for the adoption
of provisions whose effect would, in substance, be to amend the Trea-
ties without following the procedure which they provide for that
purpose."" 5
The limits set by this Declaration are not obvious, and some, in-
cluding the German Constitutional Court, have dismissed them as
insufficient. 6 The uncertain scope of Article 352 becomes evident
when we consider the EU's authority to pass criminal law measures
on racism and xenophobia. The Treaty could be read to allow the
Union to act in this area, since Article 67(3) provides that the Euro-
pean Union should strive to "ensure a high level of security through
measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia."" 7
Under this view, one could argue that the implied provision allows
the Union to act even when a crime has no significant cross-border
elements, as long as it meets the goals of Article 67(3). Yet one could
also reasonably point out, that, to the contrary, the Treaty only pro-
vides for Union authority to harmonize criminal law with respect to
cross-border offenses, as stated in Article 83(1). Under this view, any
other interpretation of the Treaty would be the equivalent of amend-
ing it.118
In addition to the potential difficulties with the Treaty basis for
expressive criminal law measures such as the Framework Decision,
other legal, political, and theoretical objections present themselves.
Broadly speaking, when contemplating action to unify national crimi-
nal laws, the Union must take into account the competing assertions
of state sovereignty and the value of keeping criminal lawmaking
114. Declaration 42, supra note 108. For the relevant ECJ case law, see Opinion 2/
94 Re Accession of the Community to the ECHR [1996] ECR 1-1759; Kadi and Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05
P [2008] ECR 1-6351, paras. 224-29.
115. Declaration 42, supra note 108.
116. See BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, para. 328.
117. TFEU art. 67(3).
118. BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, para. 327.
2012] 577
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
close to the citizens.119 Criminal law continues to be regarded as an
essential state function and a central feature of state sovereignty.120
By authorizing the state to use force against its citizens, criminal law
represents one of the most important instruments of social control. 121
The decision to use criminal prohibitions, as opposed to other sanc-
tions to ensure compliance, is a fundamental political decision that
defines a community; for that reason, it is a decision that any sover-
eign community should be able to make for itself.1 2 2 These theoretical
considerations are embodied in the legal principles of subsidiarity,
proportionality, and respect for member states' national identities,
all of which are reinforced by the Treaty of Lisbon.
Because criminal law continues to be legitimated primarily
through democratic action at the national level, national constitu-
tional courts are likely to resist expansive interpretations of the
European Union's authority to act in this area. As the German Con-
stitutional Court underscored in its recent decision on the Lisbon
Treaty, because "democratic self-determination is affected in an espe-
cially sensitive manner by provisions of criminal law and criminal
procedure, the corresponding basic powers in the treaties must be in-
terpreted strictly . . . and their use requires particular
justification."123 The resort to criminal law by the European Union
cannot be justified simply on the grounds that EU member states
have come to a political consensus.124 Instead, there needs to be an
open debate about why the nature and impact of the crime is such
that it deserves to be addressed at the supranational level.125 The
Union's interest in using the criminal law to promote its core values
must be carefully balanced against states' rights to make these
decisions.
V. RESPECTING THE LIMITS To EU CRIMINAL LAW POwERS:
THREE RESPONSES
How should the European Union respond to these reservations
about its competence to enact criminal law measures, particularly
when there is no clear evidence that a crime has a cross-border di-
119. As the Treaty itself recognizes, the move toward a closer Union is at the same
time a move that recognizes the importance of taking decisions as closely as possible
to the citizens. TEU art. 1.
120. See, e.g., BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, para. 355.
121. See Weigend, supra note 13, at 789.
122. Id. (arguing that "it is the prerogative and the duty of the community's demo-
cratically legitimated government to make decisions in this field").
123. BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, para. 358.
124. Id. para. 359.
125. For example, the UK House of Commons and the UK government have ex-
pressed the view that the EU must base criminal law harmonization on statistical
evidence showing that such harmonization adds real value to national efforts. HoUSE
OF COMMONS JUSTICE COMMITTEE, supra note 42, at 15-16.
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mension? Are there special procedures that the European Union can
adopt in such circumstances in order to allay state concerns about
overreaching? Three possible responses present themselves.
First, the European Union could adopt a conservative approach
and refrain from harmonizing criminal laws in the absence of a real
practical need and firm legal basis for supranational intervention.
The European Union could limit itself to adopting criminal laws only
in the areas specifically mentioned in the Treaty as having a cross-
border dimension and in the limited instances when criminalization
is essential to implementing preexisting EU regulations. 126 The Eu-
ropean Union would not interpret expansively its criminal law
powers and would refrain from acting when national authorities are
already addressing the problem.
Second, the European Union could seek a Treaty amendment to
give it broader authority in criminal law. The amendment could spe-
cifically authorize the European Union to pass criminal laws that
uphold enumerated core values of the Union, such as equal treat-
ment, even when no cross-border element is present. The amendment
would require ratification at the domestic level, and this process
would ensure that national concerns are heeded.
Yet because the amendment process is slow, cumbersome, and
unpredictable, the EU institutions are unlikely to invoke it. Espe-
cially given the recent comprehensive overhaul of the EU's legal
framework through the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union is likely to be
reluctant to introduce new Treaty amendments in the near future.
Instead, EU institutions would most probably prefer to find a plausi-
ble (albeit broad) interpretation of the Treaties that would authorize
them to act.
As noted earlier, the implied powers provision, Article 352, can
be interpreted to give them such authority. Yet this would be an ex-
pansive reading of the clause and may be seen to go beyond the scope
of what member states authorized when ratifying the Treaty. Be-
cause such use of Article 352 is likely to affect sensitive national
interests in the field of criminal law, it is important for the European
Union to take additional steps to ensure that national concerns are
considered.
The third possible response, therefore, would be to strengthen
the procedural safeguards protecting national sovereignty and pro-
moting subsidiarity in this area. The European Union could actively
involve the democratically elected national legislatures before taking
any decision to expand the reach of EU criminal law, and it could
allow their reasoned reservations to carry decisive weight. 127 Such an
approach would not only address concerns about subsidiarity, but
126. Id. art. 83(2).
127. See BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, paras. 358, 366.
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also reduce the likelihood that the European Union would enact legis-
lation on a less than certain legal basis.
The Treaty of Lisbon already recognizes the importance of in-
volving national parliaments in the EU legislative process. It
requires the Commission to consult national parliaments and draw
their attention to proposals under the implied powers provision. 128 It
also gives national parliaments the opportunity to review proposed
EU legislation and to object to it on grounds of subsidiarity. In crimi-
nal law, objections by one-fourth of the legislative chambers trigger
reconsideration by the Commission. 129 After reviewing the objections,
the Commission must provide reasons for its decision to maintain,
amend, or withdraw the legislative proposal.130 If a majority of na-
tional legislative chambers object, the Commission must again
review the legislative proposal. To maintain it, the Commission must
explain why it complies with subsidiarity. 31 The Commission must
then forward its reasoned opinion to the Council and European Par-
liament, either of which could vote down the proposed legislation.132
The Lisbon Treaty's introduction of subsidiarity review by na-
tional parliaments is a welcome innovation, and the recognition that
this review should be given more weight in the field of criminal law is
encouraging. But given the important interests of democratic legiti-
macy and state sovereignty that inhere in the passage of criminal
laws, even stronger safeguards should apply when the European
Union legislates on crimes lacking a demonstrable cross-border di-
mension. In such circumstances, even when parliamentary concerns
fail to reach the one-fourth threshold necessary to trigger review-
indeed, even when just one national parliament offers a reasoned ob-
jection on the grounds of subsidiarity-the Commission should
voluntarily reconsider the legislation. Given the difficulty of coordi-
nating action across different national parliaments, 33 a lower
threshold would be important for allowing national concerns to be ad-
equately presented at the EU level. Since the Treaty does not provide
for such a lower threshold, the procedure would depend on the Com-
mission's voluntary cooperation in this arrangement.
128. Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 35, art. 2; TFEU art. 352(2).
129. Lisbon Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 35, art.7(2).
130. Id.
131. Id. art. 7(3).
132. "[Ilf, by a majority of 55% of the members of the Council or a majority of the
votes case in the European Parliament, the legislator is of the opinion that the propo-
sal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall
not be given further consideration." Id.
133. A recent study confirms that, under the current threshold and deadlines, par-
liaments have difficulty coordinating actions to trigger reconsideration of the
legislation by the Commission. Piotr Maciej Kaczyfiski, Paper Tigers or Sleeping
Beauties? National Parliaments in the Post-Lisbon European Political System 10-13,
CEPS Special Report (Feb. 1, 2011), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1756817.
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As explained earlier, the Treaty already provides a procedure by
which even one member state can pull an "emergency brake" on a
criminal law measure proposed under Article 83, when it believes
that the measure would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal
justice system. Invocation of the "emergency brake" suspends the or-
dinary legislative process and refers the matter for further discussion
to the European Council. Should no consensus about the legislation
arise, nine or more states can proceed with the legislation, but the
objecting state would not be bound by it. In short, states concerned
about the effect of a criminal law on their national autonomy already
have the ability to object and exempt themselves from the proposed
measure.
The procedure I am proposing is in some respects similar to the
emergency brake, in that it recognizes that just one member state
might force the reconsideration of a criminal law. But there are sev-
eral important differences. First, the procedure proposed here would
be triggered by national parliaments, not government ministers,
which would add to its democratic legitimacy.134 Second, it would ap-
ply not only when a measure would fundamentally affect a national
criminal justice system, but also when it fails the subsidiarity test
(i.e., whenever the European Union fails to show that it is better posi-
tioned than national authorities to combat the crimes in question).
Finally, unlike the emergency brake, the procedure I propose would
lead to the reconsideration and possible defeat of the measure for all
members, rather than merely exempting the objecting state.
The proposed procedure would not require a Treaty amendment,
yet it would fulfill the goal of involving national legislatures in deci-
sions to expand the reach of EU criminal law. It would reinforce
active and respectful dialogue between the European Union and na-
tional legislatures, and it would be consistent with subsidiarity,
proportionality, and the Union's commitment to respect national
identities and essential state functions.-'3 Such a dialogue is a pre-
requisite to politically legitimate EU criminal laws, especially when
these laws are passed primarily for expressive reasons. The claim of
the European Union to define its political identity is no stronger than
national claims to do the same. When these two claims come into con-
flict, active deliberation between the EU institutions and their
national counterparts is critical to defusing the tension.
In the end, a dialogue with national legislatures is also pragmat-
ically justified. National parliaments are ultimately responsible for
implementing EU criminal laws through domestic legislation, and
134. E.g., CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 4, at 126.
135. TEU art. 4(2) ("The Union shall respect [Member States'] ... national identi-
ties, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional . . . . It
shall respect their essential State functions, including . . . maintaining law and
order.").
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national police and prosecutors are tasked with enforcing these laws.
Without democratic deliberation at the national level about the need
for new EU criminal laws, a commitment to robust enforcement of
these laws is more likely to be lacking.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the last two decades, the European Union has taken deci-
sive steps in transforming itself from a purely economic organization
to a political and social union. EU intervention in criminal law mat-
ters has played a part in this transformation. The Union has used the
criminal law to express a set of core common values and to
strengthen its political identity. The EU's action on racist and xeno-
phobic crime is an example. Both the drafting history and the text of
the legislation suggest that there was no significant cross-border ef-
fect of racist crime and no clear evidence of a practical need for
harmonizing law on this question across the EU. The symbolic nature
of the legislation is further evident in the escape clauses included in
the final version, which severely weakened the legislation's claim to
harmonize national laws. Finally, other instruments-the European
Arrest Warrant and the Additional Protocol to the Convention on
Cyber-Crime-already addressed the main problems with which the
European Union was concerned, further undermining the argument
that EU action was necessary.
Discussion of the Framework Decision on racist and xenophobic
crime raises broader questions about the legitimacy of using EU
criminal law for expressive purposes, particularly in light of the
Union's expanded powers in the field after the Treaty of Lisbon. The
new Treaty does not provide a clear and undisputed basis for such
action. The European Union may rely on its implied powers, but the
use of such powers risks the objection that the Union is encroaching
on legitimate national interests.
These national interests should not be discounted. Precisely be-
cause of its expressive function, criminal law is a critical element of
state sovereignty. The decision to use it should be made in a demo-
cratic fashion, and, in the spirit of subsidiarity, close to the citizen. To
the extent that national communities remain sovereign, they must be
able to harness the expressive value of criminal law in defining their
own political identities.
The EU's claim to define its political identity is not superior to
the national claim to do the same. Before choosing to use the criminal
law to communicate core values, the European Union should engage
in a dialogue with national legislatures. A supranational criminal
law can coexist with national criminal law, even if both are used pri-
marily for expressive purposes. But national communities should
have the opportunity to take part in the process of creating EU crimi-
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nal law, even if that means that they will sometimes derail the
process. Active participation by national legislatures would help to
ensure that supranational criminal law and the political identity it
supports do not entirely supplant national identities and values.
The process advanced in this Article is likely to be more cumber-
some and to produce fewer EU criminal laws. Yet if these laws are
passed after broad consultation and deliberation at the national and
supranational levels about their purpose and usefulness, they are ul-
timately more likely to be legitimate and effective and to lessen
perceived encroachments on national sovereignty. A more modest
and incremental view of the EU's role in the legislation of criminal
justice may better serve the political goals to which Europe and its
peoples aspire.
